Intellectual property protection

What is accessory liability for copyright infringement?

by

reviewed by

Malcolm Burrows

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16–24 minutes

Quick summary of accessory liability for copyright infringement

Accessory liability makes a person liable for copyright infringement that someone else commits.  In Australia it arises in two ways: by authorising the infringement under section 36 or 101 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act), or by assisting the infringer under a common design.  Supplying equipment or services, without more, is not enough.

Key insights

  • A person who authorises an infringement infringes copyright themselves under sections 36(1) and 101(1) of the Copyright Act.
  • Whether a person authorised an infringement turns on their power to prevent it, their relationship with the infringer and the reasonable steps they took.
  • Selling a product that can be used to infringe is not authorisation if the seller has no control over how buyers use it.
  • An internet service provider did not authorise its customers' file sharing in iiNet, but a website of links to music files, and its host, did authorise infringement in Cooper.
  • At common law, assistance makes a person a joint tortfeasor only if it is more than trivial and given under a common design.

A business can be liable for copyright infringement it did not commit itself.  Australian law reaches beyond the person who copies a work to two kinds of accessory: a person who authorises the infringement, and a person who joins a common design with the infringer and assists them.  The High Court considered authorisation in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16; (2012) 248 CLR 42 (iiNet), and the UK Supreme Court restated the common design test in Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10; [2015] AC 1229 (Sea Shepherd).[1]  This article explains both routes and what they mean for manufacturers, internet providers, website operators and company directors.  For an overview of how we help, see our copyright infringement lawyers page.

How can a person be liable for an infringement they did not commit?

In two ways: by authorising the infringement, which the Copyright Act treats as an infringement in its own right, or by joining with the infringer as a joint tortfeasor.

The exclusive rights of a copyright owner include the exclusive right to authorise another person to do an act comprised in the copyright.  Section 36(1), for works, and section 101(1), for other subject matter such as films and sound recordings, provide that copyright is infringed by a person who, without the licence of the owner, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.[2]

The High Court described the person who copies or communicates the material as the primary infringer, and the person who authorises it as a secondary infringer.  All parties in iiNet accepted that the reason for the separate wrong of authorisation is economic: cost-efficient enforcement of the rights of a copyright owner.[3]

The second route is the general law of joint tortfeasors.  Joint liability for one act of infringement can rest on agency, vicarious liability or a common design.[4]  In Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187; (2006) 156 FCR 380 (Cooper), Justice Kenny applied the statement in Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd [1996] HCA 38; (1996) 186 CLR 574 (Thompson) that "to constitute joint tortfeasors two or more persons must act in concert in committing the tort".[5]

In short, there are two routes to accessory liability in Australia: the statutory wrong of authorisation and the common law of joint tortfeasors.

What does it mean to authorise copyright infringement?

To authorise means to sanction, approve or countenance the infringement, judged by the matters listed in sections 36(1A) and 101(1A) of the Copyright Act.

In University of New South Wales v Moorhouse [1975] HCA 26; (1975) 133 CLR 1 (Moorhouse), a university was held to have authorised the copying of a short story on a coin-operated photocopier in its library.[6]  Justice Jacobs and Justice Gibbs each adopted the dictionary meaning of authorise: "sanction, approve, countenance".[7]  Justice Gibbs said:

"[A] person who has under his control the means by which an infringement of copyright may be committed – such as a photocopying machine – and who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or having reason to suspect, that it is likely to be used for the purpose of committing an infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to limit its use to legitimate purposes, would authorize any infringement that resulted from its use."[8]

Since 2000, sections 36(1A) and 101(1A) have required a court to take into account at least three matters, two of which are drawn from that statement.[9]

Factor (a)

Power to prevent

Factor (b)

Relationship

Factor (c)

Reasonable steps

Knowledge

Relevant but not decisive

The High Court warned against relying on dictionary synonyms such as countenance.  Attention is now directed first to the statutory matters, which inform whether authorisation can be inferred from the facts.[14]

In short, authorisation turns on control: the power to prevent the infringement, the relationship with the infringer, and the reasonable steps taken.

When is a person liable as a joint tortfeasor?

When they assist the infringer in a way that is more than trivial, under a common design that the infringing act be done.

Sea Shepherd was not a copyright case.  The operator of a fish farm off Malta sued Sea Shepherd UK, a charity, over an alleged attack on its tuna cage by a vessel operated by the charity's American parent organisation.[15]  Lord Neuberger set out three conditions:

"First, the defendant must have assisted the commission of an act by the primary tortfeasor; secondly, the assistance must have been pursuant to a common design on the part of the defendant and the primary tortfeasor that the act be committed; and, thirdly, the act must constitute a tort as against the claimant."[16]

Facilitating the act is not enough, even with knowledge of what the other party intends.  The assistance must be more than trivial, but it need not be essential or as significant as the role of the primary wrongdoer.  A common design can be inferred from tacit agreement.[17]  It can also be conditional, such as a plan to use force only if the occasion arises.[18]

The Court divided three to two on the facts.  A fundraising mailshot sent by its parent carried Sea Shepherd UK's name and bank details, and Sea Shepherd UK passed on the £1,730 it raised.  Lord Toulson, Lord Neuberger and Lord Kerr held that the trial judge was entitled to treat that contribution as minimal, so Sea Shepherd UK was not liable.  Lord Sumption and Lord Mance dissented.[19]  Lord Sumption gave, as an example of support that can make a person liable, using the prospect of unlawfully downloading streamed copyright material to attract users to a website, as in Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) (Dramatico).[20]

In Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed [2024] UKSC 17 (Lifestyle Equities), the UK Supreme Court added a knowledge requirement:

"[K]nowledge of the essential features of the tort is necessary to justify imposing joint liability on someone who has not actually committed the tort.  This is so even where, as in the case of infringement of intellectual property rights, the tort does not itself require such knowledge."[21]

Australian courts apply the same concept of acting in concert.  In Cooper, an employee of a web host who gave technical support, and knew of the website and the infringements it was likely to cause, was not a joint tortfeasor.[22]  By contrast, the High Court noted that a common design had been found in relation to the Kazaa file-sharing system in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242; (2005) 220 ALR 1 (Kazaa).[23]

In short, helping an infringer is not enough: there must be a shared plan that the infringing act be done, and assistance that is more than trivial.

Are manufacturers and sellers liable for how their products are used?

Not usually.  Selling a product that can be used to infringe is neither authorisation nor a common design if the seller has no control over how buyers use it.

In CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] UKHL 15; [1988] AC 1013 (Amstrad), the House of Lords held that the maker of recording machines was not liable for buyers who used them to copy recordings.  Lord Templeman said:

"The machine was capable of being used for lawful or unlawful purposes.  All recording machines and many other machines are capable of being used for unlawful purposes but manufacturers and retailers are not joint infringers if purchasers choose to break the law."[24]

The High Court took the same view of authorisation in Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth [1993] HCA 10; (1993) 176 CLR 480 (Tape Manufacturers):

"[M]anufacture and sale of articles such as blank tapes or video recorders, which have lawful uses, do not constitute authorization of infringement of copyright, even if the manufacturer or vendor knows that there is a likelihood that the articles will be used for an infringing purpose such as home taping of sound recordings, so long as the manufacturer or vendor has no control over the purchaser's use of the article."[25]

Moorhouse was different.  The university did not just fail to prevent infringement; it supplied both the copyright material and the means of copying it.[26]  For a joint tortfeasor claim, a seller generally must go further than supplying the product, for example by inducing or procuring a particular infringement.[27]

In short, selling a product that can be used to infringe is not enough: liability needs control over its use, or inducement of a particular infringement.

Accused of authorising an infringement, or pursuing someone who did? Dundas Lawyers advises copyright owners, platforms and businesses on copyright infringement claims.  Call 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

When are internet providers and websites liable for their users?

Where they have a real power to prevent the infringement and do not take reasonable steps.  Merely providing the facilities that are used to infringe is not enough.

Sections 39B and 112E provide that a person who provides facilities for making, or facilitating the making of, a communication is not taken to have authorised an infringement merely because another person uses those facilities to infringe.[28]  Separate safe harbour provisions in sections 116AA to 116AJ limit the remedies available against service providers that meet certain conditions.[29]

In iiNet, film studios alleged that an internet service provider authorised its customers sharing films over BitTorrent, because it did not act on notices of infringement.[30]  All five Justices held that it did not authorise the infringements.  iiNet had no direct technical power to prevent customers using BitTorrent, and its only power was the indirect one of ending its contracts with them.  The notices did not give it a reasonable basis to warn or terminate customers.[31]  Justice Gummow and Justice Hayne described the step from indifference to countenancing to authorisation as "too long a march".[32]

Cooper went the other way.  Mr Cooper's website was built to give users ready access to music files through hyperlinks, and he earned income from advertising and sponsorship on it.  He authorised the infringements.  In part, that was because he deliberately chose a structure that did not let him prevent or restrict that use.[33]  The company that hosted the site, and its controlling director, also authorised the infringements: the host could have withdrawn hosting, but sought a commercial advantage from advertising on the site instead.[34]

iiNet (internet provider)Cooper (website and its host)
Power to preventOnly an indirect power to end its contracts with customersMr Cooper created and maintained the website, and the host could withdraw hosting
RelationshipCustomer contracts that prohibited infringing useUsers were attracted to the site, which earned advertising and sponsorship income
Reasonable stepsThe notices gave no reasonable basis to warn or cut off customersNone: the disclaimers misstated the law, and the host sought advertising advantage instead
ResultDid not authoriseMr Cooper and the host both authorised

English courts have taken a similar approach to online marketplaces.  In L'Oréal SA v eBay International AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) (L'Oréal v eBay), a trade mark case, eBay was not a joint tortfeasor with sellers of infringing goods, because it was under no legal duty to prevent infringement and "facilitation with knowledge and an intention to profit is not enough".[35]

Where infringing material comes from a website outside Australia, a copyright owner can also apply under section 115A for an injunction requiring carriage service providers to block access to it, and, since 2018, requiring online search engine providers to stop returning results for it.[36]

In short, an online service is liable for its users only where it has real control over the infringement and does nothing reasonable about it.

Can a company director be personally liable for copyright infringement?

Yes.  A director who has the power to stop the infringing activity and does nothing can be liable for authorising it.

In Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53 (Jain), the Full Federal Court held that a director who was effectively the chief executive of a hotel owned by the company authorised unlicensed performances of music at the hotel.  It was within his power to control what was occurring, but he did nothing at all.[37]  The Court described his conduct as:

"a studied and deliberate course of action in which Mr Jain decided to ignore the appellant's rights and to allow a situation to develop and to continue in which he must have known that it was likely that the appellant's music would be played without any licence from it."[38]

In Cooper, the director who was the controlling mind of the web host did not challenge his liability for the host's infringing conduct.[39]  An employee who gave technical support, but had no authority to end the hosting, was not liable.[40]

In the United Kingdom, Lifestyle Equities held that two directors who caused their company to infringe trade marks were not liable as accessories, because they were not shown to know the essential facts that made the company's acts infringing.[41]  Lord Leggatt noted that UK copyright law is different, because the statute itself makes authorising a restricted act an infringement.[42]

In short, a director is exposed through authorisation where they control the infringing activity, and knowledge may matter where the claim relies on the common law.

Practical tips for businesses, platforms and directors

1

Prohibit infringement in your terms

Make it a term that customers must not use your product or service to infringe, as iiNet's customer agreement did, and enforce it.

2

Act on credible notices

When you receive specific, credible evidence of infringement, consider warning, suspending or withdrawing the service, as the web host in Cooper could have done.

3

Check how your platform is built

A design that makes infringement easy and leaves you unable to control it counts against you, as Mr Cooper's website did.

4

Do not rely on disclaimers

A disclaimer that misstates the law, or is only cosmetic, is not a reasonable step to prevent infringement.

iiNet's customer agreement prohibited infringing use[43], while Mr Cooper's disclaimers were cosmetic and his web host could have withdrawn hosting.[44]  See also our article on preserving metadata as evidence in a copyright dispute.

Frequently asked questions about accessory liability for copyright infringement

Key takeaways about accessory liability for copyright infringement

  • Accessory liability for copyright infringement arises by authorisation under the Copyright Act or as a joint tortfeasor at common law.
  • Authorisation turns on the power to prevent the infringement, the relationship with the infringer and the reasonable steps taken.
  • A joint tortfeasor must give more than trivial assistance under a common design that the infringing act be done.
  • Manufacturers and sellers are not liable for how buyers use their products if they have no control over that use.
  • Internet providers are not liable merely for providing access, but a website built for infringement, and its host, can be.
  • Directors who control infringing activity and do nothing can be liable for authorising it.

Need advice about a copyright infringement claim? Call Dundas Lawyers on 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

Our approach to accessory liability claims

Dundas Lawyers acts for copyright owners and for businesses accused of infringement, including platforms, manufacturers and their directors.  We look at who had control over the infringing activity and what steps were taken, and whether a takedown or a negotiated outcome is available before proceedings are considered.


Further reading

For further reading on intellectual property disputes, see the following articles written by the team at Dundas Lawyers.

Further information

If you need assistance about a claim that a business, platform or director is liable for copyright infringement by others, contact us for a confidential and obligation‑free discussion.

Doyles Recommended TMT Lawyer 2024

[1] Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16, [77]–[78] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), [143] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10, [21] (Lord Toulson), [55] (Lord Neuberger).

[2] Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 13(2), 36(1), 101(1); iiNet (n 1) [7]–[8], [103].

[3] iiNet (n 1) [8], [55].

[4] iiNet (n 1) [100] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

[5] Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187, [173] (Kenny J), quoting Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574, 580–1 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

[6] Cooper (n 5) [34] (Branson J).

[7] iiNet (n 1) [50]–[51].

[8] University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, 13 (Gibbs J), quoted in iiNet (n 1) [51].

[9] iiNet (n 1) [9], [24], [52]; Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 101(1A).

[10] iiNet (n 1) [69].

[11] Cooper (n 5) [47]–[48] (Branson J); iiNet (n 1) [66]–[67].

[12] iiNet (n 1) [9], [71].

[13] Cooper (n 5) [34] (Branson J); see also [31] (Branson J), quoting Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Copyright Agency Ltd (1996) 65 FCR 399, 422 (Sackville J).

[14] iiNet (n 1) [68].

[15] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [1]–[2], [4]–[7], [11].

[16] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [55] (Lord Neuberger); see also [21] (Lord Toulson), [37] (Lord Sumption).

[17] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [21] (Lord Toulson), [39] (Lord Sumption), [57]–[59] (Lord Neuberger).

[18] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [27] (Lord Toulson), [66] (Lord Neuberger).

[19] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [16], [26], [28] (Lord Toulson), [80]–[81] (Lord Neuberger), [87]–[90] (Lord Kerr), [52] (Lord Sumption), [101] (Lord Mance).

[20] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [38] (Lord Sumption), citing Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch).

[21] Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed [2024] UKSC 17, [137] (Lord Leggatt).

[22] Cooper (n 5) [174] (Kenny J).

[23] iiNet (n 1) [112] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

[24] CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013, 1057 (Lord Templeman), quoted in Sea Shepherd (n 1) [41] (Lord Sumption).

[25] Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, 498 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ), quoted in iiNet (n 1) [53].

[26] Cooper (n 5) [37] (Branson J).

[27] Sea Shepherd (n 1) [41] (Lord Sumption), quoting Amstrad (n 24), 1058; see also [58] (Lord Neuberger).

[28] Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 39B, 112E; iiNet (n 1) [12], [24].

[29] iiNet (n 1) [13], [25]; Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 116AA–116AJ.

[30] iiNet (n 1) [2], [4]–[5].

[31] iiNet (n 1) [65], [70], [78], [80] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), [147] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

[32] iiNet (n 1) [143] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

[33] Cooper (n 5) [2], [41]–[42], [48], [52] (Branson J).

[34] Cooper (n 5) [58], [62]–[65] (Branson J).

[35] L'Oréal SA v eBay International AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch), [375], [381]–[382] (Arnold J).

[36] Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A.

[37] iiNet (n 1) [145] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), citing Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53, 61.

[38] Jain (n 37), 61, quoted in Cooper (n 5) [38] (Branson J).

[39] Cooper (n 5) [54], [65] (Branson J).

[40] Cooper (n 5) [70]–[71] (Branson J).

[41] Lifestyle Equities (n 21) [138]–[143] (Lord Leggatt).

[42] Lifestyle Equities (n 21) [94]–[95] (Lord Leggatt).

[43] iiNet (n 1) [27], [66]–[67].

[44] Cooper (n 5) [49], [64] (Branson J).

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