Confidential information

What is the difference between know-how and confidential information?

by

reviewed by

Malcolm Burrows

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19–28 minutes

Quick summary of know-how and confidential information

Know-how is the general skill, experience and knowledge an employee builds up at work, which they may use after leaving.  Confidential information is specific information that can be isolated from that general knowledge, protected by contract and the equitable action for breach of confidence.  New Aim Pty Ltd v Leung [2026] FCAFC 49 (New Aim) shows where the line falls.

Key insights

  • A former employee is free to use the general skill, experience and knowledge gained in earlier employment, even in competition with the former employer.
  • While employment continues, the duty of good faith protects more information than the law protects after employment ends.
  • In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 (Faccenda Chicken), the English Court of Appeal held that, after employment ends, the implied term in the contract protects only trade secrets and information of equivalent confidentiality.
  • Specific information that can be readily isolated from an employee's general experience, such as supplier contacts kept on a phone, is not know-how (New Aim).
  • A former employee can also contravene section 183(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) by improperly using information obtained through their position, even if equity would not protect it.

An employee who leaves to join a competitor can take their know-how with them, but not their employer's confidential information.  Know-how is the general skill, experience and knowledge built up over a working life.  Confidential information is specific information that can be separated from that general knowledge and that the employee should recognise as their employer's.  The English Court of Appeal set out the governing principles in Faccenda Chicken.  In New Aim, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) drew the same line between know-how and specific information, for supplier contacts that a departing executive gave to a competitor.[1]  This article explains where the line falls, what changes when employment ends, and how contracts, restraints and the Corporations Act fit in.  For an overview of how we help, see our confidential information lawyers page.

What is know-how?

Know-how is the general skill, experience and knowledge that an employee acquires at work and carries in their head.  Once the employment ends, the employee is free to use it, including for a competitor.

In Faccenda Chicken, Lord Justice Neill, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, identified three (3) separate concepts in this area.  The first two were the employee's duty of good faith during the employment and the duty not to use or disclose confidential information after it ends.  The third was:

"The prima facie right of any person to use and to exploit for the purpose of earning his living all the skill, experience and knowledge which he has at his disposal, including skill, experience and knowledge which he has acquired in the course of previous periods of employment."[2]

The distinction is an old one.  In Sir W C Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 (Leng v Andrews), Lord Justice Farwell said, in a passage later approved by Lord Atkinson in the House of Lords in Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688 (Herbert Morris):

"To acquire the knowledge of the reasonable mode of general organisation and management of a business of this kind, and to make use of such knowledge, cannot be regarded as a breach of confidence in revealing anything acquired by reason of a person having been in any particular service, although the person may have learnt it in the course of being taught his trade; but it would be a breach of confidence to reveal trade secrets, such as prices, [etc.], or any secret process or things of a nature which the man was not entitled to reveal."[3]

The Full Court described the know-how of a senior buyer in the same way in New Aim:

"A person in Mr Leung's position would inevitably acquire, over time, general know-how in relation to sourcing products, dealing with manufacturers, attending trade fairs and assessing potential suppliers.  That kind of accumulated skill and experience is not, without more, protectable after employment ends."[4]

In short, know-how belongs to the employee: the general skill and experience gained at work can be used freely once the employment ends.

How do courts tell know-how from confidential information?

By asking whether the information is part of the employee's general skill and knowledge, or specific information that can be isolated from it and is confidential enough to protect.  The usual starting point is a classification of the information an employee acquires at work into three (3) classes.

Justice Goulding set out the classification at first instance in Faccenda Chicken, and the Court of Appeal set out the key passages.  The second class is closest to what is often called know-how:

"Secondly, there is information which the servant must treat as confidential (either because he is expressly told it is confidential, or because from its character it obviously is so) but which once learned necessarily remains in the servant's head and becomes part of his own skill and knowledge applied in the course of his master's business.  So long as the employment continues, he cannot otherwise use or disclose such information without infidelity and therefore breach of contract.  But when he is no longer in the same service, the law allows him to use his full skill and knowledge for his own benefit in competition with his former master …"[5]

ClassWhat it coversProtected after employment ends?
Trivial or public informationInformation that, because of its trivial character or easy accessibility from public sources, is not confidential at all, such as a published patent specificationNo, and it can be passed on even during the employment
Confidential while employedInformation the employee must treat as confidential, but which once learned becomes part of their own skill and knowledgeNo, and according to the Court of Appeal, not even by a restrictive covenant
Trade secretsSpecific trade secrets so confidential that they cannot lawfully be used for anyone's benefit but the employer's, such as a secret manufacturing processYes, even if the employee has learned them by heart

The examples in the table are the ones Justice Goulding gave.[6]  The Court of Appeal accepted that information can be confidential during the employment and yet free for the employee to use afterwards.  It relied on Printers & Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1; [1965] RPC 239 (Printers & Finishers), where Justice Cross said of a former employee's memory of his employer's printing instructions:

"[I]n so far as the instructions cannot be called 'trade secrets' and he carried them in his head, he is entitled to use them for his own benefit or the benefit of any future employer."[7]

For more on the third class, see our article on what a trade secret is under Australian law.

In short, the question is whether the information is part of what the employee knows how to do, or a specific item of the employer's information that the employee happens to know.

What changes when employment ends?

The protection narrows.  While employed, the duty of good faith (or fidelity) stops an employee using or disclosing confidential information against the employer's interests.  After the employment ends, the implied term in the contract of employment protects only trade secrets and information of equivalent confidentiality, although an express term or the equitable obligation of confidence may still apply.

The Court of Appeal stated the principles in this way.  The employee's obligations are determined by the contract of employment and, in the absence of an express term, by implied terms.  While the employment continues, the duty of good faith is broken if an employee makes or copies a list of the employer's customers for use after the employment ends, or deliberately memorises such a list.  The obligation after the employment ends is more restricted.  It covers secret processes, designs and other information of a high enough degree of confidentiality to amount to a trade secret, but not all information the employee acquired during the employment.[8]

To decide whether an item of information falls within that implied term, the Court of Appeal said all the circumstances must be considered, including four (4) matters:[9]

Matter (a)

Nature of the employment

Matter (b)

Nature of the information

Matter (c)

What the employer said

Matter (d)

Separability

In Faccenda Chicken itself, former employees used their employer's sales information in a competing business: customer names and addresses, delivery routes, requirements and times, and the prices each customer paid.  None of it was protected.  Some of the information was not confidential at all, the prices could not be clearly separated from the rest, and every salesman could quickly commit his own area to memory.  The information was known to junior staff, and there was no evidence the employer had ever told staff it was confidential.[10]

In Australia, the contract is also the starting point.  In New Aim, the Full Court said a contract claim is logically anterior to a claim for breach of confidence in equity, because the contract informs the scope of any equitable obligation and whether equity has any role at all.[11]  Equity can still protect information after employment ends.  The supplier contacts in New Aim were protected because they were precisely identified, had the necessary quality of confidence and were received in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.[12]

In short, an employer can expect loyalty while the employment lasts; afterwards, the implied term protects only trade secrets and their equivalent, although the contract or equity may protect specific confidential information.

What did the Full Court decide in New Aim v Leung?

That contact details for seventeen (17) suppliers, which a departing chief commercial officer kept on his phone and gave to a new competitor, were confidential information and not his general know-how.  He was liable for breach of confidence, breach of contract and a contravention of section 183(1) of the Corporations Act.

New Aim is a large online retailer, which by 2024 sold over 6,000 products sourced from about 400 suppliers.  Mr Leung worked for it for around ten (10) years in various roles, including Head of its Buyer Team from 2015 to July 2020 and then Chief Commercial Officer until he left in January 2021.[13]  Between January and July 2021, he gave Broers, a newly established competitor, the names and contact details of individuals associated with 17 of New Aim's suppliers.  He typically did so by sharing the WeChat contacts stored on his phone.[14]  It was not in dispute that finding reliable suppliers took effort and could take several months.[15]

The primary Judge dismissed New Aim's claims, having assessed confidentiality across the information about all its suppliers.  Justices Moshinsky, Thawley and Button allowed the appeal.  New Aim had conducted its case on the basis that the information about the 17 suppliers was confidential, and once attention was directed to that information, the claim should have succeeded.[16]  The Full Court said:

"The contact details were not general knowledge which Mr Leung carried in his mind independently of the details recorded on his phone.  The information was distinguishable from general knowledge about market conditions or general means of identifying reliable suppliers."[17]

The respondents argued that the information could not realistically be disentangled from Mr Leung's general know-how, including relationships he had built over many years.  The Full Court accepted that the argument had considerable force for all of New Aim's suppliers, including inactive ones, but less force for the 17.[18]  Those contacts were passed on within a confined time, to shortcut the process of finding reliable suppliers and let Broers start trading quickly.  The information "was capable of ready isolation from Mr Leung's general experience and judgment", and was "more appropriately characterised as specific information than as part of Mr Leung's general know-how".[19]

The Full Court asked whether a person of average intelligence and honesty would think it improper to use the information, and applied what Vice-Chancellor Megarry said in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227 (Thomas Marshall):

"[I]t would be remarkable if a man of average intelligence and honesty were to think that there was nothing improper in using his detailed knowledge of his employer's suppliers and customers for the purpose of dealing with them in place of his employer."[20]

The position was clearer than in Thomas Marshall, because the details were not in Mr Leung's memory but in his WeChat contact list.  His use of them "was more than the application of general skill or experience".[21]  It was not decisive that New Aim's contracts did not mention suppliers, or that it could have done more to protect the information.  Nor did the fact that employees used their own phones for work, and some had supplier details on them, of itself make the information non-confidential.[22]

The case was sent back to the primary Judge to decide relief against Mr Leung and the claims against the two competing businesses.[23]

In short, specific information an employee keeps and passes to a competitor is not know-how just because the employee gathered it over years of experience.

Has a former employee taken information to a competitor, or are you being accused of it? Dundas Lawyers advises employers, employees and new employers on confidential information disputes.  Call 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

Can a contract or restraint of trade protect know-how?

Not general know-how.  A confidentiality clause can define what the employee must keep confidential, and a reasonable restraint can protect trade secrets and customer connections, but neither can stop a former employee using their general skill and knowledge.

Justice Goulding suggested in Faccenda Chicken that an employer could protect second-class information with an express covenant restraining the employee from competing.  The Court of Appeal respectfully disagreed.  A covenant will not be upheld on the basis of the information a former employee might disclose unless that information is a trade secret or its equivalent.[24]  The Court relied on Lord Parker's statement in Herbert Morris that a restrictive covenant will not be enforced unless the protection sought is reasonably necessary to protect a trade secret, or to prevent some personal influence over customers being abused in order to entice them away.[25]

Restraints do have a place where employees will inevitably carry trade secrets away in their heads.  Justice Cross said in Printers & Finishers that the employer's remedy then is not to ask the Court to stretch the law of confidence:

"[T]he proper way for the plaintiffs to protect themselves would be by exacting covenants from their employees restricting their field of activity after they have left their employment, not by asking the court to extend the general equitable doctrine to prevent breaking confidence beyond all reasonable bounds."[26]

A confidentiality clause matters too.  Mr Leung's contract said that he might become acquainted with confidential information, which "may or may not be expressly designated as such", and obliged him to keep it confidential during and after his employment.[27]  The contract did not define confidential information or mention suppliers, but the claim in contract succeeded for the same reasons as the claim in equity.[28]

A clause can also work against an employer.  In Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 2; (2009) 81 IPR 1 (Futuretronics), a supplier's name that a former employee disclosed was not shown to be confidential, so it fell outside the definition in his contract.  The Full Court treated it as part of his knowledge, skill and experience, which had become his own.[29]

Labelling everything as confidential does not help.  An employer cannot prevent use or disclosure merely by telling the employee that information is confidential, although its attitude to the information is evidence of its status.[30]

In short, contracts and restraints can protect trade secrets, confidential information and customer connections, but not the general know-how an employee is entitled to take away.

Can a former employee be liable if the information is not confidential?

Yes.  Under section 183(1) of the Corporations Act, a current or former director, officer or employee must not improperly use information obtained because of their position.  The information need not be confidential in equity.

Section 183(1) provides that a person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use the information to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation.  A note to the subsection says the duty continues after the person stops being an officer or employee.[31]

The primary Judge in New Aim, following Futuretronics, treated the claim under section 183(1) as rising or falling with the claim for breach of confidence.  The Full Court disagreed.  Section 183(1) is not a statutory enactment of the equitable action for breach of confidence, and "information" in the section is not limited to information that equity would treat as confidential.  To the extent Futuretronics took a narrower view, it was too narrow.[32]  Confidentiality still matters: the more confidential the information, the easier it ordinarily is to establish improper use.[33]

Impropriety is judged objectively, by the standard the High Court stated in R v Byrnes [1995] HCA 1; (1995) 183 CLR 501 (Byrnes):

"Impropriety consists in a breach of the standards of conduct that would be expected of a person in the position of the alleged offender by reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authority of the position and the circumstances of the case."[34]

Mr Leung fell short of that standard.  He knew the supplier information was commercially valuable and that New Aim took steps to keep it secret, and he must have known that disclosing it was likely to let a competitor source products much faster.  He had also suggested that Broers use images from one of New Aim's websites.[35]  The Full Court held that section 183(1) was contravened even if New Aim had failed to prove the information was confidential in equity.[36]

In short, a departing employee who improperly uses information from their old position can be liable under the Corporations Act even where a breach of confidence claim would fail.

Practical tips for employers protecting confidential information

1

Define what is confidential

List the categories that are genuinely confidential to your business, such as supplier identities and contact details or pricing, rather than declaring everything confidential.

2

Limit and record access

Keep sensitive information to the people who need it, and keep a record of the controls you use.

3

Deal with personal devices

Where staff use their own phones for work, have an exit process for work contacts and records, as the contacts in New Aim sat in a personal WeChat list.

4

Use restraints for what they can protect

Use a reasonable restraint of trade for trade secrets and customer connections.  It will not stop a former employee using general know-how.

Faccenda Chicken treats restricted circulation and the employer's attitude as evidence of a trade secret[37], and in New Aim the Full Court relied on the steps New Aim took to limit access to supplier information.[38]  See also our article on preventing ex-employees from using your client list.

Frequently asked questions about know-how and confidential information

Key takeaways about know-how and confidential information

  • Know-how is the general skill, experience and knowledge an employee gains at work, and the employee can use it after leaving.
  • Information the employee must keep confidential while employed may still become part of their know-how once the employment ends.
  • Under Faccenda Chicken, the implied term after employment protects only trade secrets and their equivalent, but the contract and equity may also protect specific information.
  • In New Aim, supplier contacts kept on a phone and passed to a competitor were specific confidential information, not know-how.
  • A restraint of trade or confidentiality clause can protect trade secrets and customer connections, but not general know-how.
  • Section 183(1) of the Corporations Act can apply to a former employee's improper use of information even if it is not confidential in equity.

Need advice about confidential information and a departing employee? Call Dundas Lawyers on 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

Our approach to know-how and confidential information disputes

Dundas Lawyers acts for employers, and for employees and their new employers, in disputes about confidential information and know-how.  We identify precisely what information is said to be confidential, test it against the contract and the matters the courts weigh, and consider whether undertakings, a negotiated outcome or an urgent injunction is needed.


Further reading

For further reading on confidential information, see the following articles written by the team at Dundas Lawyers.

Further information

If you need advice on protecting confidential information, or on what a departing employee can take with them, contact us for a confidential and obligation‑free discussion.

Doyles Recommended TMT Lawyer 2024

[1] New Aim Pty Ltd v Leung [2026] FCAFC 49, [1]–[5], [29]–[30]; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117, 128, 135–8.

[2] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 128 (Neill LJ, for the Court).

[3] Sir W C Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763, 774 (Farwell LJ), quoted in Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 135; approved in Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688, 705 (Lord Atkinson).

[4] New Aim (n 1) [115].

[5] Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589, 598–9 (Goulding J), quoted in Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 133.

[6] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 133–4.

[7] Printers & Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1; [1965] RPC 239, 253 (Cross J) (not reported on this point in the WLR), quoted in Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 136.

[8] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 135–6.

[9] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 137–8.

[10] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 139–40.

[11] New Aim (n 1) [31], citing Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J) and Del Casale v Artedomus (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 172; (2007) 165 IR 148, [118] (Campbell JA).

[12] New Aim (n 1) [120]–[122].

[13] New Aim (n 1) [1].

[14] New Aim (n 1) [3]–[5].

[15] New Aim (n 1) [12].

[16] New Aim Pty Ltd v Leung (No 4) [2025] FCA 747; New Aim (n 1) [30](a).

[17] New Aim (n 1) [80].

[18] New Aim (n 1) [114]–[116].

[19] New Aim (n 1) [116], citing Del Casale (n 11) [41] and Printers & Finishers (n 7) 6 (WLR) (Cross J).

[20] Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227, 246 (Megarry VC), quoted in New Aim (n 1) [117].

[21] New Aim (n 1) [118]–[119].

[22] New Aim (n 1) [108], [110]–[111].

[23] New Aim (n 1) [29], [169], order 3.

[24] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 134, 137.

[25] Herbert Morris (n 3) 709 (Lord Parker), cited in Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 137.

[26] Printers & Finishers (n 7) 6 (WLR) (Cross J), quoted in Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 137–8.

[27] New Aim (n 1) [33].

[28] New Aim (n 1) [30](b), [110].

[29] New Aim (n 1) [139], [145]–[146].

[30] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 138.

[31] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 183(1) and note 1; New Aim (n 1) [123]–[124].

[32] New Aim (n 1) [132], [134], [136], [149], discussing Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 2; (2009) 81 IPR 1, [44]–[46].

[33] New Aim (n 1) [125], [127].

[34] R v Byrnes [1995] HCA 1; (1995) 183 CLR 501, 514–15, quoted in New Aim (n 1) [128].

[35] New Aim (n 1) [154]–[160].

[36] New Aim (n 1) [30](c), [162].

[37] Faccenda Chicken (n 1) 138.

[38] New Aim (n 1) [111], [120](d)(ii).

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