shareholder oppression

Can a shareholder inspect a company’s books?

by

reviewed by

Malcolm Burrows

Reading Time:

11–17 minutes

Quick summary of a shareholder’s right to inspect books

Yes, with permission or a court order. Under section 247A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), a member can ask the Court to authorise inspection of the company’s books. The Court can only make the order if it is satisfied that the member is acting in good faith and the inspection is for a proper purpose.

Key insights

  • Apart from registers, a shareholder has no automatic right to inspect a company’s books; the directors, a general meeting or the Court must authorise it.
  • The shareholder bears the onus of proving good faith and a proper purpose, which the courts treat as one composite test.
  • The purpose must relate to the shareholder’s rights as a shareholder, such as investigating a breach of directors’ duties or oppression.
  • There must be a real “case for investigation”: curiosity or general suspicion of management is not enough.
  • Requests must be targeted; broad requests are commonly cut down to the documents that match the purpose.

In Enares Pty Limited v Nimble Money Limited [2022] FCAFC 126 (Enares), the largest shareholder in an unlisted lender, holding about 15% of its shares, applied urgently to inspect the company’s books after the board refinanced its debt instead of pursuing a rights issue the shareholder preferred. The Full Federal Court upheld the refusal of inspection: there was no foundation for the shareholder’s concerns, so it was not acting in good faith or for a proper purpose.[1] This article explains when a shareholder can inspect a company’s books under section 247A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act), and what the cases require. For an overview of how we help, see our shareholder oppression lawyers page.

Does a shareholder have a right to inspect the company’s books?

Not automatically. Apart from registers, a shareholder can inspect the company’s books only if the directors or a general meeting allow it, or the Court orders it under section 247A.

A company must allow anyone to inspect the registers kept under Chapter 2C, such as the register of members, and members can do so without charge.[2] Beyond that, the directors, or the company by resolution at a general meeting, may authorise a member to inspect the books. This is a replaceable rule, so the company’s constitution may change it.[3]

If the company will not agree, a member can apply to the Court. The Court may authorise the member, or another person on the member’s behalf, to inspect the books, and the person inspecting may make copies unless the Court orders otherwise.[4]

“Books” is defined broadly. It includes a register, any other record of information, financial reports or records, sustainability reports or records, and any document.[5]

A separate limb lets a person who has, seeks or is eligible to seek leave to bring a derivative action on the company’s behalf apply for inspection, for a purpose connected with that action.[6]

In short, inspection is a privilege the company or the Court grants, not a right every shareholder has.

What do good faith and proper purpose mean?

They mean the shareholder genuinely holds a purpose that relates to its rights as a shareholder, and the Court asks both whether that purpose is legitimate and whether the shareholder is really pursuing it.

The applicant bears the onus of establishing that it is acting in good faith and for a proper purpose.[7] The courts treat the phrase as a composite test rather than two separate elements, and the proper purpose must be the applicant’s dominant purpose. It must also relate to each category of documents sought.[8]

In Enares, the Full Court said the cases are generally concerned with two questions: whether the asserted purpose is legitimate, given the relationship between the shareholder, the company and its directors; and whether the applicant has proved, by admissible evidence, that it actually has that purpose.[9]

A proper purpose must relate to the applicant’s rights as a shareholder. In Ingram, inspection was refused because the shareholders wanted documents for claims about conduct that had induced them to invest, which were claims as investors, not as shareholders.[10]

Investigating whether there has been a breach of directors’ duties or oppressive conduct is “self-evidently” a proper purpose, and so is a desire to protect the shareholder’s investment.[11] But mere dissatisfaction with the board’s management decisions is not enough. Hostility towards the directors does not by itself rule out a proper purpose.[12]

In short, the purpose must be a shareholder’s purpose, genuinely held, and directed at something the shareholder is entitled to investigate.

How much evidence does a shareholder need?

Enough to show a real “case for investigation”: an objective basis for the concern, not proof that something has gone wrong.

Without a reasonable basis or foundation for the asserted purpose, an application cannot be made in good faith, however strongly the applicant believes in it. The rule excludes shareholders who simply want to check that nothing has gone wrong.[13]

More than curiosity or general suspicion of management is required. The applicant must at least be able to articulate a basis on which it might be found that illegal, improper or otherwise undesirable conduct has occurred.[14] The shareholder does not have to prove the breach, and the Court does not decide it, but there must be some tangible support for the concern beyond mere belief or assertion.[15]

In Style, inspection was ordered because the shareholder had raised specific financial issues that the company had not answered; they were “substantive and not fanciful” and not “artificial, specious or contrived”.[16] A concern that fails that standard cannot support an application, even if it is genuinely held.[17]

The size and history of the holding also matter. A shareholder with a significant holding held for some time will more easily discharge the onus than one who has recently acquired a token holding.[18]

In short, the shareholder needs evidence that makes the concern real, but not evidence that proves the case.

Why did the shareholder fail in Enares when others succeeded?

Because its concerns had no objective foundation. The shareholders who succeeded pointed to specific, unanswered issues.

In Enares, the company’s senior debt and subordinated notes were about to fall due. The shareholder wanted the board to raise money through a rights issue it might underwrite, but the board refinanced with new notes. By the hearing, the shareholder said it was concerned the directors had breached their duties or acted oppressively, and about the value of its shares. The Full Court held that the board had tried equity raisings without success, the shareholder’s proposal was conditional and indicative only, and there was no foundation for the alleged concerns.[19] Its concern about protecting its investment was put at a high level of generality and depended on the same unfounded concern, so there was no issue to investigate.[20]

CaseWhat the shareholder soughtResultWhy
Enares [2022] FCAFC 126Board papers about a debt refinancing it disagreed withRefusedNo foundation for the concern that the directors breached their duties; the board had no real alternative
Style [2009] FCA 314Books relevant to financial issues it had raisedGrantedSpecific financial issues the company had not answered
MJM [2024] FCA 691Broad access, including accounting software, bank records and emailGranted in partProper purpose shown, but the request was far too wide; access limited to management fee documents

In MJM, a one-third shareholder raised concerns arising from the company’s draft 2023 financial report. The Court accepted that investigating a breach of directors’ duties or oppression was a proper purpose, even though proceedings had already begun, but limited access to documents about the payment of management fees in that financial year.[21]

In short, a shareholder who can point to a specific, unexplained issue is likely to obtain inspection; one who disagrees with a reasonable board decision is not.

What can be inspected, and on what terms?

Only the books that match the proper purpose, usually identified by category and period, and often on conditions about use and disclosure.

Targeted

Identify classes of books

Board papers

Results, not every paper

Not discovery

No substitute for litigation

Conditions

Limits on use and disclosure

For why the records matter in a dispute, see our article on the importance of evidence in oppression claims.

In short, a narrow, well-defined request is more likely to succeed and more useful when it does.

Being kept in the dark about the company’s finances? Dundas Lawyers advises shareholders on inspection applications and oppression claims. Call 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

Practical tips for shareholders seeking inspection

1

Ask the company first

Request the documents in writing and explain why. The directors can authorise inspection without a court order.

2

Write down your concern

Identify the transaction or decision that troubles you and the facts that give the concern an objective basis.

3

Ask for categories

List the classes of books and the periods you need, and link each one to your purpose.

4

Act as a shareholder

Keep the purpose tied to your rights as a shareholder, not as a lender, bidder, investor or litigant.

See also our article on the early warning signs of shareholder oppression, including being denied information.

Frequently asked questions about inspecting company books

Key takeaways about inspecting company books

  • Apart from registers, a shareholder needs the directors’, a general meeting’s or the Court’s authorisation to inspect the books.
  • The shareholder must prove good faith and a proper purpose connected with its rights as a shareholder.
  • There must be an objective case for investigation; curiosity or disagreement with the board is not enough.
  • Enares failed for lack of foundation, while shareholders with specific, unanswered concerns have succeeded.
  • Orders are limited to targeted categories of books and often carry conditions on use and disclosure.

Need advice about access to a company’s books? Call Dundas Lawyers on 07 3221 0013 or submit an enquiry online.

Our approach to inspection applications

Dundas Lawyers acts for shareholders seeking access to company records and for companies responding to those requests. We identify the specific concern and the evidence behind it, ask for the right categories of books, and try to resolve access by agreement first, so any court application is focused and the records can be used in the next step of the dispute.


Further reading

For further reading on shareholder rights and oppression, see the following articles written by the team at Dundas Lawyers.

Further information

If you are a shareholder and need advice on your right to inspect a company’s books and records, contact us for a confidential and obligation‑free discussion.

Doyles Recommended TMT Lawyer 2024

[1] Enares Pty Limited v Nimble Money Limited [2022] FCAFC 126, [1], [5], [7] (‘Enares’).

[2] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 173(1)–(2).

[3] Ibid s 247D.

[4] Ibid s 247A(1)–(2).

[5] Ibid s 9 (definition of ‘books’).

[6] Ibid s 247A(3)–(5).

[7] Enares (n 1) [37].

[8] Ibid [38].

[9] Ibid [39].

[10] Ibid [40]–[41]; Ingram as trustee for the Ingram Superannuation Fund v Ardent Leisure Ltd [2020] FCA 1302, [74] (‘Ingram’).

[11] Enares (n 1) [42].

[12] Ibid [43].

[13] Enares (n 1) [44]–[46].

[14] Rasley (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Financial & Energy Exchange Ltd [2020] FCA 1462, [28] (‘Rasley’), quoted in Enares (n 1) [47].

[15] Enares (n 1) [47].

[16] Merim Pty Ltd v Style Ltd [2009] FCA 314, [66]–[67] (‘Style’).

[17] Enares (n 1) [48].

[18] Mesa Minerals Ltd v Mighty River International Ltd [2016] FCAFC 16, [22] (‘Mesa’).

[19] Enares (n 1) [2]–[5].

[20] Ibid [72]–[73].

[21] M.J.M Holdings (NT) Pty Ltd v Australian Marine Contractors [2024] FCA 691, [1], [4], [91]–[93], [96] (‘MJM’).

[22] Re Tolco Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1069, [26], quoted in Furniss v Blue Sky Alternative Investments Ltd (No 3) [2021] QSC 230, [15] (‘Furniss’).

[23] Mesa (n 18) [22], citing Acehill Investments Pty Ltd v Incitec Ltd [2002] SASC 344, [31].

[24] Furniss (n 22) [17].

[25] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 247B–247C; Rasley (n 14) [103].

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